ABSTRACT. An algorithm is a procedure, given by a finite set of instructions, to serve as follows in relation to a given infinite class of questions, (a) If we select any question from the class, the instructions will tell us how to perform a step, (b) After any step, if we do not receive the answer then, the instructions together with the existing situation will tell us what step to take next, (c) The instructions will enable us to recognize when a situation is reached in which the answer is before us, and to read it off then; and this will eventually happen if the question has an answer. In 1980 Mathematics Subject Classification, Primary 03D20; Secondary 03D10, 03A05. Key words and phrases. The first recursion theorem, schemata for recursive definitions, primitive recursion, algorithms, Herbrand-Gödel general recursiveness, ^-definability, Turing computability, partial recursiveness, Church's thesis, Church's theorem, Gödel's theorem. 'I prepared this paper for a general audience. Then I was amazed to find on the program twenty-three other papers (including four special sessions organized by Richard A. Shore) on recursion theory, which illustrates the health of the nonagenarian.
You may wonder why in 1980 I am dwelling on this. There is a point of view (developed by me since 1977) from which the quantum jump at midlife of recursion theory from dealing only with primitive and other special recursive functions to general recursive functions can be based on thinking through the form of a recursion as exemplified by this definition of a + b.
However, let me first deal with this less boldly. The definition of a + b comes under the general form of a primitive recursion on b with n -1 ( > 0) parameters a l9 . . ., a n , 4 <J>(0, a 2 , . . . , a n ) = \p(a 2 , . . ., a n ) 9 <j>(b\ a 2 , . . ., a n ) = x(b> <K&> <*2> • • • > <*n)> <*2> • --> a nY
In our example of a + b 9 there is one parameter a (n = 2), and the functions \p and x assumed as already known are xp(a) = a 9 x(P, c, a) = c'. The characteristic feature of primitive recursion is that, e.g. with one parameter a, the value of the function </ > being defined for any given pair (b 9 a) of arguments with b > 0 is made to depend via a previously known function on its value for the pair (b -1, a) (besides on b and a), and so by iteration on its values successively for (b -2, a), (b -3, a),.. . and ultimately for (0, a), which value is given by a previously known function of a. This makes Dedekind's [1888] theorem that a function is defined by the recursion quite transparent.
The functions commonly used in arithmetic or elementary number theory are primitive recursive. Something of a calculus of primitive recursive functions was developed by Skolem [1923] , Gödel [1931] and Péter [1934] , from which my exposition in [1952, Chapter IX] drew heavily.
In [1928] Ackermann gave an example of a recursion on two variables n and b simultaneously (with one parameter a). In this recursion, the value of the function £ in question for a triple («, b, a) of argumentswith n 9 b both > 0 is made to depend on its value for certain triples (n, b y a) with (n 9 b) preceding (n, b) in the ordering by the ordinals n<o + b 9 and is given by a Generalizing from the k = 1 case (primitive recursion) and the k = 2 case (exemplified by Ackermann's double recursion), Péter [1936] studied the hierarchy of increasing classes of functions definable using A>fold recursions for k = 1, 2, 3, .... So much for the first phase of recursive function theory.
A half century ago there was a great ferment in thinking about the foundations of mathematics. Stimulated by Cantor's development of set theory ([1874] , ) and the ensuing paradoxes (from 1895 on), the schools of logicism, intuitionism and formalism had taken the field. The formalists (after Hilbert) had put portions of classical mathematics into the setting of fully formalized systems, and proposed to study these systems (in particular to prove their consistency) by "finitary" methods, indeed by the methods of elementary intuitionism (after Brouwer). Hilbert had posed in [1918] the problem of the solvability in principle of each mathematical question, and the problem of the decidability of a mathematical question through a finite number of operations. Applied to a formal system, we thus have the problem of finding a decision procedure (Entscheidungsverfahren) whereby, given any formula of the system, its provability or unprovability in that system can be decided in finitely many steps. Thus arises the Entscheidungsproblem or decision problem, which had also appeared in Schroder [1895] and Löwenheim [1915] .
What is all this really about? Let us try to view it from a standpoint above the details of one or another particular formal system. What does a formal system really do, and what would a decision procedure be?
The germ of the concept which gives us the overview we want now has been in mathematics for more than two millenia: the idea of algorithms.
An algorithm is a method or procedure, established by a finite set of rules or instructions, to serve as follows in relation to a given infinite class of questions, (a) After the procedure has been described, if we then select any question from the class, the procedure will apply and tell us how to perform a step, the first of a sequence of one or more steps, (b) After any step, if we do not then receive the answer to the question selected, the instructions together with the existing situation (to which that step led) will tell us what step to take next, (c) The instructions will enable us to recognize when a situation is reached in which the answer is before us, and to read it off then; and this will eventually happen (after a finite number of steps). In performing the steps and reading off the answer, we have only to follow the instructions, like robots; no insight or ingenuity or invention is required of us.
To be more specific, consider various sorts of infinite classes of questions. To begin with, let us take as our object domain the natural numbers, or a similar countably infinite domain of objects each finitely describable by its generation or position as a member of the domain.
As we know, we can define functions of one or more variables, each ranging over the natural numbers, e.g. by recursion. We can also define properties and relations (i.e. propositional functions, or as I will preferably say "predicates") of natural-number variables, by defining functions and setting them equal to 0, and further by applying logical operations (including the quantifiers "for all x" and "(there) exists an x (such that)", or in symbols "(*)" and "(Ex)") to predicates already defined.
If we have a predicate P(a) or P(a l9 ..., a n ) with natural-number variables, we may have an algorithm for the infinite class of questions "Is P(a) true?" or "Is P(a lf . .., a n ) true?". We get a particular question of the class by selecting a particular natural number as the value of a or a particular «-tuple of natural numbers as the values of a l9 ..., a n . These questions call for "yes" or "no" as answers. The algorithm is then also called a decision procedure for the predicate P. If such exists, the predicate is called decidable.
Similarly with a number-theoretic function <j>(a) or <t>(a x , . .., a n ) 9 an algorithm for the infinite class of questions "What is the value of <t>(a)V or "What is the value of 4>(a l9 ..., a n )T 9 is also called a computation procedure for the function <f >. If such exists, the function is called computable.
Since to any predicate P(a) or P(a v .. ., a n ) we can correlate a function <t>(a) or <j>(a l9 .. ., a n ) taking the value 0 or 1 according as the proposition taken as value by the predicate is true or false, decision procedures are encompassed under computation procedures.
The example of Euclid's greatest common divisor algorithm (fourth century B.C.) illustrates that algorithms were present in Greek mathematics. The name "algorithm" is a corruption of the last part of the name of Abu Abdullah abu Jafar Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khowarizmi, the ninth century Arabian mathematician who came from the Khowarizm oasis in central Asia.
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The objective of formalizing a mathematical theory a la Hubert is to remove all uncertainty about what constitutes a proof in the theory, of course only after likewise fully specifying what are the formulas expressing propositions of the theory. Given a proposed proof, it must be possible by application of the rules defining the formal system to check in finitely many steps whether or not it really is a proof.
In brief, disregarding differences among various ways of carrying out the details of formalization, the aim of embodying a theory in a formal system is to establish an algorithm for the notion of proof (besides of formula) in the theory. And the decision problem for a given formal system is the problem of finding an algorithm for the notion of provability (i.e. of the existence of a proof) in it.
So we fall back on the two-thousand-year-old idea of algorithms. What this mathematical tradition gives is numerous examples in which mathematicians agree that an algorithm is or is not provided. For example, a primitive recursion (2) provides an algorithm for the function 4> defined by it (assuming we already have algorithms for the functions \p and x)-But a definition of the form <t>(a) = (the least x such that \fs(a 9 x) = 0 if such an x exists, and 0 otherwise), where there is a known algorithm for \(/, does not of itself provide an algorithm for <j>. With a particular i//, some theory might be developed that would lead to an equivalent formulation that would provide an algorithm. For example, this happens if we succeed in proving that, if there is an x such that \p(a, x) = 0, there is such an x < 0(a) where 0 is a function for which we have an algorithm.
In the world of mathematical ideas existent in 1930, one had no basis for establishing the impossibility of there being an algorithm for a given class of questions. For that one would need, further than particular examples, some characterization of the shapes of all possible algorithms on a given domain.
The second half-century of recursive function theory is marked by the introduction of such a characterization, in a number of equivalent versions. At the beginning of the 1930's, no overview was possible on the most fundamental problems of the foundations of mathematics without this step.
We have already seen that primitive recursions, and more generally fc-fold recursions, define functions algorithmically, while descriptive definitions like "the least x such that t//(a, *) = 0 if such an x exists, and 0 otherwise" do not, at least not without supplementation.
This suggests trying to define all possible algorithms on the natural numbers by generalizing from the primitive and fc-fold recursions.
Gödel in [1934] , building on a suggestion of Herbrand in a letter in 1931, gave a definition of "general recursive functions" which took for generalization the feature that the equations giving the values of the function defined by such a recursion are formally derivable from the equations of the recursion by using a substitution rule and a replacement rule. However, Gödel, Church had been pushing on the problem of characterizing all number-theoretic functions for which there are algorithms ("effectively calculable" as he phrased it); and as a graduate student under him I had been finding in example after example of functions for which there are algorithms that their definitions could be expressed in a certain formalism affording algorithms (arising out of Church [1932] , [1933] ) which we called the "X-calculus", i.e. those functions are "X-definable". This work of mine was mainly done in 1932 (published in [1935] ). Thereafter Church announced his "thesis" (published in [1936] , and so named in my [1943] , [1952] ) that all the functions for which there are algorithms are Church-Kleene X-definable, or equivalently (as was proved in his [1936] and my [1936a] ) Herbrand-Gödel general recursive.
Turing in reached the same conclusion independently, using as a third equivalent notion computable by idealized computing machines of a certain kind (error-free and with unbounded memory), or "Turing computable". Post in a brief note [1936] These various equivalent formulations have respective merits (discussed for some in my [1981a] ). Turing's computability is intrinsically persuasive in the sense that the ideas embodied in it directly support the thesis that the functions encompassed are all for which there are algorithms; A-definability is not intrinsically persuasive (the thesis using it was supported not by the concept itself but rather by results established about it) 8 and general recursiveness scarcely so (its author Gödel being at the time not at all persuaded).
What I propose to do in the rest of this talk is to develop another equivalent formulation, which comes out of generalizing from primitive and other special recursions in a different direction than Gödel did in [1934] , and which I believe I can say is intrinsically persuasive.
In my development I shall need the function cs (for "case") defined by In (10), we can think of the right side as the result of using a known functional \p with one «-place function variable TJ, for which in the recursion we substitute the function <f > being defined, and n number variables 81. Thus we construe (10) as having the form *(*) ***(*; «).
(11) Similarly, a double recursion such as (6) can be put in the form (11).
We may want to use several such recursions, perhaps with intervening composition steps, in a row, so that the i//'s for later ones are defined by earlier ones. This leads us to generalize from (11) to allow besides r\ also more function variables 0 l9 . . ., 0 t (= 0 briefly), thus <f>(0; %) ~ iffo, 0; 31) c^xKW <|>(0; Stt), 0; 31).
The third expression makes it explicit (using Church's A-notation [1932] ) that the 4> in the second is being considered as a function of the number variables 21 for given values of the function variables 0. In (11) when its \j/ is given by the right side of the primitive recursion (10), the recursion (with the definitions of cs, -1, \p 9 x) determines the function <j> completely, the values being obtained by repeated applications of the equation. Similarly with the double recursion (6) put in the form (11). But this is not always the case. For example, if the \p in (11) is like the right side of (10) but with a primitive recursive function ir replacing -1 where only for some values of a does a, 7r(a), ?r(7r(a)), ir{ir(jT{a))), . . . include 0, then <f>(a) is defined by the recursion (and the definitions of cs, ?r, \f/ 9 x) exactly for those values of a. In this paragraph, I am assuming \p and x to be completely defined.
Consequently, in generalizing from primitive recursions etc. in the present direction, we shall allow our functions, such as <f> in (11) Partial number-theoretic functions were first explicitly introduced into recursive function theory in my [1938] , where I partialized the functions for Herbrand-Gödel general recursiveness (Gödel [1934] and my [1936] (12) as a functional equation in <J > when xp is partial recursive is partial recursive. In (11) and (12), I use "~" rather than "= " to express that both sides are defined with the same value or both are undefined. (I prefer to reserve "= " for the partial recursive predicate which is defined as usual when both sides are defined and is undefined otherwise.)
Now instead I am taking (12) as a schema of definition to generate a partial recursive functional <f >, or with 0 empty (i.e. (11)) a partial recursive function <J>. I use (12) (or (11)) with the understanding that «0; 21) (or «21)) is defined only as the equation requires it to be in a certain manner that can be reduced to the application of certain computation rules (my [1978, 2.2-2.4]).
Let us return to my description of an algorithm, in the paragraph above beginning with the words "An algorithm is ... ". There I talked about "situations" and "steps". What are we handling? Surely, the situations are some kind of finite complexes of symbols in the context of a question picked for the algorithm. As we must have discreteness, these complexes must be built in some regular manner from finitely many occurrences of symbols from a given finite list. They may be simply finite (linear) sequences of occurrences of those symbols, or they may be other regular finite arrangements of occurrences, as in elementary school arithmetic, or in the computation trees of my [1959] Because an algorithm can be thus analyzed as resting on the application of (13) with functionals x and p for which we already know how to get the values, I am led to argue that, if we start out with the functionals that we must regard as known initially, and repeatedly use (12) with \p composed from the functionals we have already, followed each time if necessary by further steps of composing functionals, we will get all the functionals for which there are algorithms.
What functionals should we start with? We know the natural number sequence 0, 1 ( = 0'),. .., a, a\ . . . by its generation from 0 using the successor operation '. Surely then we know the following functionals: constant functional) ; and, given a number argument a, we can have it as an identity functional, also its immediate successor a' 9 and also a -1 which is its immediate predecessor if it is > 0. These are fundamental to finding our way around in the natural number sequence. Furthermore, we can assume we will always know whether we have before us 0 or a successor, and act accordingly. Acting accordingly can consist in then writing the respective one of two given numbers b and c. So we adopt the schema <H0; *, *, c, 93) c* cs(«, b 9 c) \=l
S5.1 if a > 0 Let 0 = (B l9 . . ., Bj) be variable or fixed functions of m l9 .. ., m, variables, respectively. Then (for t = 1, ...,/) B t shall be used only by taking its value (i.e. the value of whatever function we have at the moment as the value of B t9 if 0 t is not fixed) for a given w r -tuple of arguments for which it is defined. Thus we have the schema <H0; 33, OE) ^ 0,00) SO. where 33 consists of m t variables. It is fundamental to this theory that a function variable (or an assumed fixed function) B t is used only thus. We utilize no global information about the 0 r We only grope for one value at a time, by using SO with a given m,-tuple of values of 33.
11 Turing [1939] , in a somewhat different context, described this as appealing to an oracle for the function B t9 who, questioned with a tuple of arguments, reveals the corresponding value.
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These are what we must start with. Furthermore, we want to be able at any stage to throw together functionals already available to us in any combinations, under the usual practice with notation for functions (composition of functionals). E. 
each partial recursive functional <>(©; a l9 ... 9 a n ) is given for some fixed z as
•(8;«i ^«WVi 4 (IT)
The method of the proof is this. A partial recursive functional <f>(0; a l9 . . ., a n ) is defined by a sequence of schema applications, whereby <>!,..., «^ with <f > = «^ are defined successively. A system of indexing can be established so that an index z of <f > represents this sequence of schema applications (details in my [1978, 1.3]), and thus encapsules the definition of </ >. Now, if we take z as a variable, we can devise an algorithm which is an algorithm for all algorithms (with the list 0): a universal algorithm. 15 In some detail: Having an index z, we can give numbers e (called Gödel numbers in anc * P*(0; z> <*> b) with the following properties. Take any choice of (0; z, a), i.e. of values of the variables 0, z, a 9 to select a question for our universal algorithm, 0 being / functions of m l9 . . ., m t variables respectively. If z is an index of a partial recursive functional <J > of / function variables with m l9 ..., m t number variables respectively and n number variables (if so, n is given by z), then x*(®î *> a, 0) = 0 and p*(0; z, a 9 0) is the code of the computation just begun with <^(A) 0 , . . ., p*_ x ) as the initial 0-expression. 16 Thus we take 0 O°, ..., P*_ x as the formal number variables for the functional <f> = <j> p in whose computation for a l9 . . ., a n as their values (and for 0 as chosen) we are interested. For a > 0, we determine a l9 . . . , a n from the chosen a by writing a = (a l9 . . ., a k } with a k > n 9 if necessary by taking a t = 0 for all sufficiently big i < n = k; for a = 0, we take a x = .. . = a n -0. In the said computation, we shall need no other number variables than P$ ,. . . 
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Universal algorithms (in other representations) first appeared in my [1936] and Turing . How simply can we define an unconfutable function? Take the case 0 is empty and 91 is one variable a, so {z} 0 (a v . . ., a n ) specializes to {z}(a). Using ( How does the definition (18) of £(a) fall short of providing an algorithm for it? We would clearly have an algorithm for f if only we had one for deciding which of the two cases applies. Thus there can be no algorithm for the predicate (Ex) T(a 9 a, x)\ This is a version of Church's theorem [1936] . We have an undecidable predicate, obtained simply by prefixing an existential quantifier (Ex) to the decidable predicate T (a, a, x) .
It is easy to proceed from this result to two celebrated results concerning formal systems.
I consider how certain propositions, depending on a parameter a, are expressible by formulas in a suitable formal system. The system can be the usual formal system of elementary number theory or various other systems. In a suitable formal system, the propositions (Ex)T(a 9 a> x) for a = 0, 1, 2, . . . will be expressed by respective formulas A a (obtained from a by an algorithm) such that A a is provable if and only if (Ex)T(a 9 a, x) (is true). The "only if" is a consistency property (often reducible to what Gödel called "w-consistency"). The "if comes about because a formal proof of A a should be obtainable, corresponding to the informal proof of (Ex)T(a 9 a, x) which consists in verifying by the decision procedure for T that T(a 9 a, x) for the given a and a suitable x.
This being the case for a formal system, the system is undecidable; i.e. there is no decision procedure (Entscheidungsverfahren) for the provability of any formula in the system. For, if there were, by applying it to the formulas A a (obtainable from a by an algorithm) we would have an algorithm for (Ex)T(a, a 9 x), which we just saw cannot exist. This reasoning can be used to establish the undecidability of the usual formal system of elementary number theory, and also of the pure first-order predicate calculus (a famous result of Church [1936a] and Turing ).
Consider the negations of Jhe propositions (Ex)T(a, a 9 x) 9 i.e. (Ex)T(a 9 a, x) or equivalently (x)T(a 9 a 9 x). In any of the aforesaid systems in which the propositions (Ex)T(a 9 a 9 x) are expressed by closed formulas A a (not the predicate calculus, where A a have free predicate variables) and which have the symbol -i for negation, the propositions (x)T(a 9 a 9 x) are expressed by the formulas -i^,. Suppose that (as a consistency property) -\A a is provable only if (x)T(a 9 a 9 x). I shall argue that it is not the case that, for every a 9 -nA a is provable if (x)T(a 9 a 9 x). For, as remarked above, the accomplishment of a formal system is to provide an algorithm for the notion of proof. Applying this to the formulas -iA a9 and using the algorithm for getting these from a 9 the predicate -i ^4 a -is-provable is expressible in the form (Ex)R(a 9 x) where R(a 9 x) is the decidable predicate that x is the code (say a Gödel number in the manner of Gödel [1931] ) of a proof of -\A a . Now if, for every a 9 -nA a is provable if (as well as only if) (x)T(a 9 a 9 x) 9 we would have that, for all a 9 (x)T(a 9 a 9 x) = (Ex)R(a 9 x). But (x)T(a 9 a 9 x) is not expressible in the form (Ex)R(a 9 x) with R decidable. For if it were, we could decide whether or not (Ex)T(a 9 a 9 x) by looking for the least x (which must exist by the law of the excluded middle) such that either T(a 9 a 9 x) or R(a 9 x) 9 and answering "yes" or "no" according to whether, for that x 9 T(a 9 a 9 x) or R(a 9 x). This is a generalized version (given in my [1943] , and less simply in my [1936] ) of the famous theorem of Gödel [1931] on the existence of formally undecidable sentences in Principia Mathematica and related systems (the first of the two incompleteness theorems of [1931] ): for some number/?, the formula -\A p is unprovable, and also true (i.e. (x)T(p 9 p 9 x)) so that A p is also unprovable. 17 The theorem in this version is generalized from Gödel (correctly, i.e. with the requisite consistency properties) and satisfy the structural requirement that there is an algorithm for being a proof. Here there is no possibility of escaping the incompleteness (as by seeking to devise a formal system quite remote in its details from Principia Mathematica), since the features of formal systems just named are objectives of ours in formalizing theories including elementary number theory. In this version, the formally undecidable sentences A p (with different numbers p for different formal systems) express values of the preassigned number-theoretic predicate (Ex)T(a, a, x) . As I expressed it in [1943], there is neither a complete algorithmic theory for this predicate (i.e. (Ex)T(a, a, x) is undecidable), nor (by the generalized Gödel theorem) a complete formal deductive theory.
These were among the results that ushered in the second half century (nearly) of recursive function theory.
Much has happened since then. Many of the newer developments have been associated with the use of function variables, as illustrated above by the 0Y
To begin with something not so new, take the idea of a total recursive functional <|>(0; W) and specialize to the case of one assumed function 0 and that one-placed and total and one number variable a. By <f>(0; a) being recursive we define when one one-place number-theoretic function <f > = Xa <!>($; a) is recursive in another 0 = Xa 9(a). Here <f > and 0 can be the functions (taking only 0 and 1 as values) which represent two predicates P(a) = <f>(a) = 0 and Q(a) = 0(a) = 0. The recursiveness of P in Q, formulated differently by Turing in [1939] , gives a reducibility notion that was used by Post [1944] , [1948] in studying the number-theoretic predicates. Slightly earlier, in my [1943] I described a hierarchy of number-theoretic predicates in which two positions are occupied by the decidable predicates R(a) and the predicates expressible in the form (Ex)R(a, x) with R decidable, which we encountered a moment ago. This hierarchy can be extended way upward. One of the ways of extending it beyond arithmetic is to use variables of successive higher finite types 1, 2, 3,.. . consisting of the total one-place functions over the preceding type to the natural numbers (where type 0 is the natural numbers). I took the step to include type 1 (of which a version is given above) in [1950] with [1955], [1955a], [1955b] ; and to all finite types in [1959] and [1963] . What I have drawn upon in today's lecture is the use of the first recursion theorem as one of a list of schemata in my revisitation of the resulting generalized recursion theory in [1978] and [1980] . Here I have focussed on what comes out of that when we specialize to using only number variables and numbertheoretic function variables. This concludes my discussion of elementary recursive function theory from a higher standpoint.
